André-Paul Frognier (andre-paul.frognier@uclouvain.be) For a long time, support for European integration could be analysed without much reference to the attachments of European citizens to their nations. Beyond the recurring acknowledgement of the strong social determination of attitudes towards Europe, analysts did observe important differences in support between European countries, but these were considered as encompassing all sorts of differences between these countries; there was no need to infer major differences in the ways different peoples of Europe relate to their own country.
The notion of identity has been deeply criticized in political science 1 because of its diversity of meaning and uses (Brubaker & Cooper 2000) . However, consistent with the work of Charles Tilly, we think that it is better to "get identity right" and to remember that "identities are social arrangements", and consequential ones, resulting from collective negotiations about who people are (Tilly 2003, p. 608) . At the collective level, we thus consider identity -and in this case national identity -as a complex pattern of meanings and values related to the group whose borders are defined by the state's capacity to intervene, and which underlies the varied representations and attitudes of the citizens towards each other and towards others (Duchesne, 2003) At the individual level, we take identity to be a continuous (re)combination of different identifications, that is, of changing but relatively persistent pattern of references to potential groups of belonging (Duchesne & Scherrer 2003) . The notion of identification that we will use in this text represents the link between a person and the members of one of his/her many potential groups of reference. An individual identifies with different groups -and hence does have different identifications -while he/she has only one identity which may change over time to a certain extent but is considered basically stable. So the notion of identification with someone's nation or with Europe only refers to whether somebody does in fact feel related to the national or European people, whether he/she feels concerned by what happens to them, and whether he/she feels him/herself to be part of this citizenry. A person's identity combines national and European identifications with many other possible identifications with groups defined on varied bases like gender, generation, race, social class, language, geography, ideology, hobbies, etc. Our focus here will be restricted to the way identifications with nation and Europe relate to each other. A similar point -the observation that an individual identity is the combination of belonging to diverse groups -is made by most analysts of what they nevertheless call European identity (see for example Castano or Bruter). We choose to differentiate identity and identification for conceptual clarity of course, but also because identification points out to a very important aspect: the current middle term changing character of territorial sense of belonging. If nations are ancient enough to make sure that speaking of national identity refers to consistent feelings of belonging 2 , the EU is too young to have yet given rise for sure to deep and consistent feelings of belonging. Writing about European identity may be misleading; identification with Europe rightly emphasizes that we are dealing with a process.
Current Alternative Hypotheses
Different hypotheses may be considered regarding the relationship between national identifications and the way identification with Europe may develop. Generally speaking, the old dream of the EU founding fathers was to see citizens identifying more and more with Europe and eventually stopping to identify with their nations -a transfer of attachment that was expected to ward off the nationalist conflicts and wars that have cast a shadow over the continent for the last centuries. For the time being, this dream has been proved partly wrong by the revival of nationalisms, either in the conflicts resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Empire in Eastern and Central Europe, or in the longstanding electoral success of nationalist parties in Western Europe. However, we will consider three alternative hypotheses regarding the way identification with Europe grows in a context of persistent strong national identifications.
First, some scholars believe that the European Union marks the start of a new kind of political system, free of any kind of exclusive commitment of its citizens-be it because of the development of a basic global solidarity or because of the transformation of political decision systems from governments to multi-level governance (Meehan 1996; Wiener 1998; Ferry 1998; Neveu 2000 , Nicolaidis & Weatherill 2003 . If this was the case, then identification with Europe -more precisely in this sense identification with the European Union -would be an original process, based on different kinds of feeling and sense of belonging than former identification with one's nation. If this hypothesis is valid, indicators of national and European identification should be statistically unrelated (hypothesis one).
Alternatively, other researchers keep considering that identification with Europe develop on a similar way that identification with nations developed in the 19 th century, and expect feelings of belonging to Europe to be very similar in nature to the way citizens who identify with their nation relate to it. Such feelings are moreover considered necessary to legitimate the (European) political system and to give rise to much-needed political participation, more particularly, electoral participation. In this case, two possibilities remain. Nations may be either considered as standing in the way of European integration because the two levels of government tend to compete with each other for the loyalty of European citizens (Dogan 1994; Mayer 1996; Carey 04; McLaren 06) : in this case, we would expect a negative and significant statistical relationship between indicators of European and national identification (hypothesis two). Or Europe is rather seen as a complement to the nations, an empowerment; Nations thus constitute a kind of model, an incentive framework of we-feeling and provide citizens with a tendency to feel and act as members of a political community (Duchesne & Frognier 94, 02; Schild 2001 , Citrin & Sides 2004 Diez-Medrano 04; Bruter 05) . In this later case, we would expect a positive and significant statistical relationship between indicators of European and national identities (hypothesis three).
As the quoted references indicate, these three hypotheses are indeed supported in the literature. The first hypothesis is mainly discussed on a theoretical point of view, but empirical evidence is given for the other two. Which means that researchers using empirical data prove both that national and European identifications tend to be antagonist and that they tend to be cumulative. Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, although they focus on support to European interaction rather than identification with Europe, make a similar conclusion concerning the paradoxical effect of national feelings: "The paradox that we identified earlier is apparent: national identity contributes to and diminishes support" (Hooghe & Marks 2004, p. 417) The aim of this paper is first to confirm and then suggest an interpretation of this apparent paradox.
Indicators and Methodology
If we wish to work on identification, as identification refers to in-depth attitudes compared with opinions, we ideally should use a complex variety of indicators that would allow us to distinguish between the different dimensions at work in the constitution of attitudes towards Europe and its nations. How much do citizens' attitudes towards Europe and their nation embody a true feeling of belonging? How much are these attitudes dependent of cognition and evaluation? How much are they a consequence of more general political orientation? How do they reflect extraneous disposition to xenophobia and/or openness? Etc. In order to establish the true extent of belonging measured by declaration of support to the European Union, one needs indicators that account for a certain degree of stability of the measured attitude and its relative independence from current affairs. The analysis of such a topic is hence strongly dependant on available data. As most people interested in European attitudes, we will use Eurobarometer surveys. We have to admit though that the data are somehow disappointing.
Regarding the measure of identification with one's nation, we had until very recently to content ourselves with a question asked periodically about national pride. Luckily, this question was precisely the one that Michelat and Thomas have shown in France, in the sixties, to be the most suitable for measuring the feeling of belonging to the national group 3 -a feeling that they proved to be relatively independent from the two other main dimensions of national identification: the feeling of superiority of one's nation and the attachment to the nation's sovereignty. In their data, these other two dimensions were highly dependent on a general ideological structure (right/left) contrary to the feeling of belonging to the nation.
Concerning measures of identification with Europe, the situation is more complicated. The surveys of the Commission have always asked a series of questions, named "trend questions", in order to measure public opinion towards the European integration process; very few of them related to the affective dimension of the individual though, to her/his personal relationship to the community. During the eighties 4 , they regularly asked one question about respondents' consciousness to be European citizens. This question was worded in such a way that identification with the European Community was implicitly considered complementary to identification with one's nation. This question was abandoned in 1992 and replaced by another built on the idea of a possible exclusiveness of the two 5 . This unfortunate change makes it difficult to assess whether and how the Maastricht Treaty and the public debate about its ratification have transformed the relationship between national and European identifications. Moreover, the answers to this later question are far from being as stable as a measure of identification should be. In the absence of other questions or other datasets of similar extent, we will attempt to make some inferences from this survey series over the last twenty years. Other questions have been introduced since 2000 that we will use to confirm our analysis.
Of course, sceptical readers of quantitative survey analysis may wonder about the validity of the use of questions and notions that probably take on rather different meanings in each of the studied countries, as Juan Diez Medrano brightly showed for Spain, Germany and the UK in Framing Europe (2003) . We will apply what Jan Van Deth names an "inferential strategy" (J. Van Deth 1998, p.1-20) : if we observe in the different countries a consistency in the relations between our dependant variables (internal consistency) and others (external consistency), we will consider our questions as having at least one common dimension of meaning -a dimension that allows us to make comparative analysisdespite the various significations that Europe and the nation may have in the many countries of the sample. Concretely, this means that we will not set out to analyse and compare the evolutions of the levels of answers to these questions, national pride and European identification. Instead we will focus the analysis on their statistical relationship. If we can also show some kind of consistency in the relations over the time, the hypothesis of validity of the indicator will be even more plausible. 6 between national pride and the correspondent measure of European identification -namely "how often do you think of yourself as not only national but also European" through to 1988, and then "if you think of yourself in the near future as national only, national and European, European and national or only European" from 1994 onwards -for each country and each survey. For the first years of analysis, the results are fairly clear: there is hardly any statistical relationship between our two indicators. The data clearly demonstrate that when someone says that she/he is very proud of her/his nationality, she/he is not less likely to feel her/himself as European. In 1982, the rare cases where the Kendall's tau-b is statistically significant-Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy and Luxemburg -the relationship is such that the more someone says that she is proud of her country, the more often she is likely to think of herself also as European (see also Duchesne & Frognier 1994) .
Assessing the Paradoxical Relationship between National and European Identifications
In 1992 the indicator of European identification changed. The old and the new questions (feeling not only national but also European and seeing himself in the near future as national and/or European) were asked this very year in the same survey, but not the question on national pride. So we cannot evaluate the impact of the change of question on the measure of the relationship between national and European identifications. However, in 1994 the interviewees are asked again about both national pride and their likeliness to feel European, using the new indicator, and a significant negative relationship shows up in most of the studied countries (except Greece, Ireland and Portugal) 7 . In 1997, a first quick look at the data on the EC level confirms the trend of antagonism: on the whole, in the weighted data, 54 % of the people saying that they there are very proud of their nation see themselves in the near future as only national, with only 43 % of the people saying that they are rather proud, and 38 and 40% of those that are not very or not proud at all. But a closer look at the data set shows that this relationship is not stable from one country to the other. Amongst the twothirds of countries where the correlation is negative, it is fully significant only in France, Great Britain, Luxembourg, Sweden and West Germany. Moreover, in five other countries, namely Belgium, Greece, Italy, Ireland and Portugal, the relationship is different: despite the antagonism implied by the question between thinking of oneself more as national than European or the opposite, most people in these five countries who tend to feel more European than national nevertheless feel proud or very proud of their nations. The correlation computed on the European sample is thus partially an artefact. This reminds us about the danger of analysing European data as a whole, without referring to the particular structure of territorial identities of each country, as national differences are still very large. While until 1988 the available data tend to support the thesis of the independence of European identification from the national one, data from 1994 allow us to suspect a (growing?) antagonism between these two levels of identification. Different authors have analysed the 1994 data as a proof of a change of nature of European identification: the Maastricht Treaty would have turned mere opinions on a remote and vague object (the EC) into a real process of identity building, potentially conflicting with other allegiances (Mayer 1997; Blondel, Sinnott & Svensson 1998 , Dupoirier et alii 2000 . What best explains the negative and significant correlations of 1994: the change of question about European identification or a change in the very nature of identification with Europe? A third hypothesis is possible: a change of context. In 1994, European elections took place that followed the ratification and the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty. In that period, nationalist political forces, what the French now call "sovereignist", did their best to make themselves heard and understood. The impact of nationalist arguments in electoral rhetoric could account for the strength of the correlations observed in the 1994 data; and their following weakening would then be explained by the diminution of the public debate as the electoral campaign becomes more distant. If this interpretation is valid -if the antagonism between national and European identification is significantly due to the electoral context of 1994 -we should observe the same kind of effect during similar contexts, as long as the corresponding survey questions are available.
Since 1999, our two basic questions -national pride and thinking of oneself as national and/or European -have been asked every year. Moreover, just after the next European election that took place in Spring 1999, they were present in three surveys in a row: Autumn 1999, Spring 2000 and Autumn 2000. Thus, it makes it possible to compare the evolution of correlations with the period 1994/1997.
In 1999, another year with European elections, we observe as in 1994 a rather strong negative relationship between our two questions. For the whole (weighted) sample, 58% of the people saying that they are very proud of their country think of themselves in the near future only as national, while this is the case for 41% only of those who say they are fairly proud of their country, and 38% and 37% of those not very or not proud at all of their country. Furthermore the relationship is equivalent, negative and significant, for almost all countries (except Belgium, Finland and Portugal). This pattern of relationship continues in Spring 2000: again, there is more than 20% difference in the proportion of people thinking of themselves in the near future as national only (which means that they do not think of themselves as Europeans at all) depending on whether they are very proud or not of their country (56% of the very proud against 35% of the rather proud and 34% of both the not very and not proud at all). The relationship is significantly negative in almost all countries, except Finland (again) and Italy.
But things become slightly different by Autumn 2000. The people saying that they are very proud of their country are still more likely to think of themselves as only national, but the difference is much smaller (6 points instead of 17 in 1999 and 21 in Spring 2000) . Perhaps more importantly, the relationship becomes more varied across countries. It is fully significant in eight cases out of seventeen -mainly the same as in 1997 (West Germany, France, Luxembourg, Great Britain, Luxembourg and Sweden) plus Denmark, Spain and the Netherlands. In the other countries, the relationship becomes insignificant and the sign even changes in Portugal and Finland. So it seems that we observe in 1999 the same effect as in 1994: public debate about the EU has an important influence on the nature of the relationship between identification with one's nation and with Europe. In this context, being very proud of one's nation tends to prevent feeling European while this is not the case when the public debate fades. Of course, the time periods between the surveys in the two analysed cases are very different, which makes the interpretation less certain; but the effect is striking.
In 2001, 2002 and 2003 , when the two relevant questions are asked again, we observe that the correlation between them increases again considerably. In 2002, the Kendall's tau-B reaches either its highest level or levels similar to those from 1994 and early 2000 in every country, except in Ireland and Northern Ireland 8 ; and it remains quasi stable in 2003, for most countries. These strong negative correlations from 2001 onwards fit with our interpretation of the preceding fluctuations of the relationship between national and European identifications according to the intensity of the debate about Europe. In this period, the Euro was introduced in twelve European countries, which brought the EC back to the forefront of public debate. This occurred at the same time as the European Convention and the debate about the ratification of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.
The pattern of correlations that we observe between our two variables displays a high degree of consistency: the shape of the curve of the correlations is very similar from one country to the other (cf.chart 1) -which is absolutely not the case if you observe the correlations between national pride and some trend indicator of support to European integration 9 . It validates a changing relationship between national feelings and identification with Europe: when Europe is not a matter of public debate, the two belongings -nation and Europe -appear, with our indicators, to be rather independent from one another. Moreover, considering that the question on identification with Europe implies an antagonism between the two levels, could thus even be considered slightly cumulative. However when the public debate is focused on the EC, because of European elections, ratification of treaties or the introduction of the Euro, a strong national pride seems to hamper the growth of identification with Europe. As Europe evolves from a remote and administrative loosely identified object to a concrete and political system, this second configuration tends to be the norm. This changing relationship and confusing between national pride and European identification could be interpreted as an evidence of the superficiality of the attitudes towards Europe and the strength of elites influence on citizens' self representation. We suggest another interpretation. Instead of being the result of the strong influence of elites on weak attitudes, it could be seen as a consequence of the complexity of identification processes. In the next section, we will give further evidence of this complexity by looking at other indicators of relationships to Europe and the nation, and by suggesting an explanation: the duality of territorial identification.
National or European Identifications: Different Processes at Stake
Since Autumn 2000, the Eurobarometer surveys also ask people about how much they feel proud of being European, and clearly, except in the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland and Greece, being proud of one's nation is far from being incompatible with being proud of Europe (see table 2): in the four surveys, on average, more than 80% of the people saying that they are very proud of being European also answer that they are very proud of their nation. About two thirds of the respondents indicating that they are very proud of their country are also very or fairly proud of being European. Great Britain and Northern Ireland are the only countries where the majority of respondents who say that they are very proud of their country also say that they are not proud of being European as well. How can we explain that, at the same time, with the same dataset, we find for almost every country (again, except the UK and now Greece), evidence of a negative relationship between national pride and European identification while national and European prides are clearly positively related? How can a relationship be apparently so highly dependent on the way it is measured and show so much consistency in its changes over time? Our explanation is the following: the strength of the contextual effect and the changing relationship between national pride and the different measures of European identification are a consequence of the duality of the relationship between national and European identifications, duality which is basically a characteristic of the very notion of territorial identification itself. To identify oneself with one's nation or any other group defined by a territory implies two different processes. First, it assumes one's tendency to identify with any group; and then it implies the propensity to identify with the specific group defined by this specific territory. At the European level, these two processes of identification may generate contradictory relationships with former national identification: the two levels are generally cumulative when the tendency to identify with any group is concerned; and potentially competitive when the disposition to identify with a specific territorial community is at stake. The interference between these two processes gives rise, when observed with aggregated data, to the paradoxical statistical relationship between measures of identification with nation and Europe.
The first process -the tendency to identify with a group -is challenged by the growing individualism of modern societies. Norbert Elias (1991) has shown how the recurrent shift of the social survival unit from the very local to the nation, then the continent and may be mankind, has resulted in growing individualism. The last two decades have shown though that the nation, however abstract or constructed it may be, still generates strong feelings of belonging. It seems to remain a very efficient source of group identification, of self-representation as the member of a group, which fuels we-feelings to other groups, especially to other territories that have an embedded relationship with the nation. In this process of we-building, national and European identifications are cumulative: geographers as well as political scientists refer to them as "nested identities (Herb & Kaplan 1999; Risse 2001; Medrano & Gutiérrez 2001 ).
The second process, which implies the propensity to identify with the specific group defined by this specific territory, involves the delimitation of the group as a strong constituent of group identification. Since Fredrik Barth's (1969) pioneer work on ethnic identities, the process of otherbuilding has been considered as a basic characteristic of any kind of identity and a well-documented element in the analysis of nation and nationalism, as in Gellner's most famous work (1983) . Here, national and European identifications, instead of reinforcing each other, are in a competitive relationship.
We first elaborated this hypothesis of a dual process of identification 10 in reference to a qualitative survey about mass-level representations of citizenship conducted at the end of the 1980s in France (Duchesne 1997) . The in-depth interviews collected for this research led us to consider two distinct models of citizenship. The first one was constructed around the very notion of national identity, while the second one was built against any form of belonging to a group, be it territorial or not -that is, in opposition to any form of group identification. If European integration had only been a step forward in the individualisation of societies, as Elias's later work considers it, we should have found Europe mentioned mostly in the second model, by interviewees reluctant to profess any national commitment. On the contrary, the interviewees who were more nostalgic of a national interpretation of history mentioned it all the more. Europe appeared then as a fallback position against what was not yet named "globalisation"; as a defence against the progressive removal of national borders, considered by the same people as inevitable, against the dissolution of all the elements that, in their perspective, constitutes the basis of personal identity. But they obviously feared, as much as they were hoping for them, the changes about to come and expected the change of allegiance from their nation to Europe as a difficult one. In this sense, Europe was thus also clearly conceived as an "imagined political community -and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" as Benedict Anderson famously defined a nation.
According to us, the analysis of the changing but well-founded relationship between national and European identifications presented above may be interpreted as a confirmation of the hypothesis elaborated with reference to the French case. Regardless of the distinctive character of each nation, the identification with one's nation as well as the identification in progress with Europe results of, at least, two distinct processes: one refers to the disposition of the individual to identify with collectives; the second relates to a possible competition between his groups of belonging, which can, under certain circumstances, drive him to arbitrate between them. Concerning the relationship between national and European identifications, the first process will tend to generate a positive relationship between the two as national and European feelings of belonging feed on the same disposition to identify with a remote and abstract -or "imagined" -group; while the second process may very well give rise to a negative relationship if the two political communities, the national and the European, are presented as rivals. This is why the statistical relationship between the two indicators of European and national identification varies, according to a consistent pattern, from negative values in context of public debate about Europe, when the arguments of Eurosceptics or "souvereignists" 11 are loudly expressed, to almost insignificant values the rest of the time, as the two processes -the cumulative and the exclusive ones -have effects that may neutralize each other in the measurement of the statistical relationship between the national and European commitments. This is also why different questions about national and European identifications, if they point out differently to these two different processes at stake in territorial identification, may produce opposing statistical relationships between the two levels.
Let us come back briefly to the introduction and the three hypotheses found out in the literature: how does our interpretation fit in this framework? According to us, hypothesis one is ruled out by the empirical evidence of a persistent, although complex, statistical relationship between our indicators of national and European attachment 12 . Hypotheses two and three actually both correspond to our two processes of identification: depending on the way elites and the mass media interpret and advertise the European system in progress, European citizens will tend to expect from it either an encompassing polity aiming to complement and empower the nations or as a powerful political system competing with them for sovereignty. The first process -where identifying with Europe means to have a disposition to we-feeling -is not so much taken into consideration by the literature. We do believe that it matters.
This idea, that people have a variable disposition to identify with groups defined par territoriesthat is, that there are people for whom the territory does constitute a valid marker of identity and others, incapable of this kind of projection, should be tested with data including questions about the refusal of any kind of belonging. The Eurobarometer 54.1 (Autumn 2000) and the 60.1 (Autumn 2003) provide us with new questions. In addition to the questions about national and European pride, we find a series of questions about the degree of attachment to each of the territories nested in Europetown, region (despite the heterogeneity of these notions in Europe), nation and Europe
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. A simple cross tabulation between these various attachments enables us to investigate, once more, the lack of antagonism in belonging to these nested territories -and consequently, to confirm that some respondents are characterised by a disposition to reject identification to any level of territorial belong. In 2003 for instance, on the whole sample, 71.5% of the people who say that they are very attached to their town also say that they are very attached to their country, 79.5% of those who say so about their region are also very attached to their country and this is also the case of 88.9% of the interviewees that are very attached to Europe.
The correlations computed for each country (see table 3 ) are (almost) all significantly positive and are all the stronger between adjacent questions. For instance, correlations between identification with town and region tend to be much stronger than correlations between identification with town and country or correlations between identification with town and Europe. Although the correlations between attachment to the nation and Europe are all weaker than the correlations between the attachment to the nation and its infra-territories, they are all significantly positive -apart from Northern Ireland 2003. However the strength of the correlation varies strongly from one country to another. In some countries, especially Greece, Northern Ireland and Great Britain, the correlations between the nation and the European level are much smaller than the correlation with the local levels, while in countries like Denmark, East Germany or Sweden, these correlations are very similar. These results are consistent with our finding that Greece, Great Britain and Northern Ireland display a lesser tendency towards a cumulative character of national and European identities than other EU countries. Our knowledge of the Greek situation does not allow us to make any interpretation of this result. As for the UK, we could formulate at least two different hypotheses. First, the cumulative dimension of territorial identifications can be activated only for nested territories. Obviously, the UK is not perceived by most British citizens as nested in Europe, which is referred to as being abroad; Europe remains an "other", even if sometimes a positive one, in the British context. Secondly, the theory of cumulative identification was elaborated from the French case, where the national link refers very much to the territory: the French "imagined community" is very much described in territorial terms, the French soil being at the same time the scene of common history, the common heritage of French citizens and the common graveyard of French people. The first results of a comparative qualitative research on British national identity in England do not display the same reference to the British soil as being an imagined link between the people. Our hypotheses are also consistent with the general decrease of the correlations between the attachment to the country and to Europe from 2000 to 2003, and the contrasting variability in the pattern of correlations between attachment to the country and to the town and the region, which seem to change quite randomly. Referring to the long term analysis of the correlation between national pride and our main indicator of identification with Europe, 2000 was considered to be a context of low intensity of antagonism while 2003, on the contrary, displays a high level of activation of the antagonistic dimension of the two identifications.
Empirical evidence of the dual processes at stake in the identification with Europe
Let us try to provide some evidence of the duality of the process of identification with Europe. We computed a factor analysis of all the sets of variables in our dataset that refer to the territorial identification. The first factor explains a little more than one third of the variance. It gathers strong and positive contributions from all the measures of attachment and pride (with loadings contributing slightly more to the factor for the national and subnational entities). Eurocitizen, which is the only indicator that records a choice between levels of identification, is also the only variable that hardly loads on the first factor. The second factor contains strong positive contributions from the questions concerning Europe and negative (although less strong) contributions from all other questions. When the same analysis is done at the country level, the results are very similar. The same first two factors appear in the analysis of all countries. The interpretation of these two factors is quite straightforward. The first factor refers to the cumulative dimension of national and European identification, the social disposition to belong to any available territorial group, while the second relates back to the exclusive one, to the potentially politically constructed antagonism between two political systems, the European and the traditional ones (nation and subnational entites), competing for legitimacy. However, this competition seems a little less marked between Europe and nation, than between Europe and local entities 16 . The problem with this kind of analysis, and chart, is that we postulate a linear relationship between the items of each question. In order to check this, we proceeded to a second factor analysis, which deals with items instead of variable: a correspondence analysis. With correspondence analysis, basically, two items are close if they represent answers given by the same or similar respondents, that is, respondents who give similar answers to the other questions taken into account in the same analysis (Lebart et alii, 2006) . Chart 3 displays the first two dimensions. With correspondence analysis, the points coordinate do not necessarily indicate their relative weight. The way items contribute to each dimension is indicated as follows: with (1) if they contribute clearly to the first factor, with (2) if they contribute to the second one. We need this indication in order to decide if we have to take an item into account in the interpretation, its position on the chart is not enough. Lastly, items are represented thanks to triangles whose proportion is relative to the number of cases.
Chart 3 : Analyse des correspondances des items relatifs aux questions sur les identités On the chart, the « very » items -very attached to, very proud of any territorial level of belonging -are very close to one another, more than the other series -the "fairly", "not very" and "not at all" answers. This means that there is a strong cumulative tendency with this items; while this is less the case for the others categories. It means that respondents who says they feel "very attached to" or "very proud of" one of their territorial community are likely to feel "very attached to" or "very proud of" their others territorial communities too. So if someone says he/she is very proud of his/her nation, he/she is likely to feel very proud of being European too, and likely to feel very attached not only to his/her nation, but to Europe, his/her region and town as well. While if he/she answers he/she feels fairly or not very proud of his/her nation, his/her answers regarding the others questions, and more specifically Europe, are less predictable.
The first factor opposes the "very" items concerning all levels of identification, to the "fairly" and "not very" items corresponding to the national and subnational levels -so not concerning Europe. Not only this factor opposes strong positive identification to answers with less intensity, but it opposes a European, national and subnational nested identification to national and subnational cumulative belonging that does not include Europe.
The second factor is more complicated as it opposes the "fairly attached to" and "fairly proud of" Europe and the nation, as well as what we called the Eurocitizens 17 , to two series of items: on one hand, the item "national only"; on the other hand, the items "not at all attached to" and "not at all proud of" Europe and "not very attached to the country". The combination Europe/nation is thus opposed to two different attitudes: on one hand, an exclusive attachment to the nation, on the other hand, a rejection of identification -more pronounced vis-à-vis Europe than the nation, but the respondents who declare that they are not at all proud of their nation are actually quite rare in Eurobarometer surveys.
These results confirm the first factor analysis, with the same mix of cumulative and exclusive identification. It gives a more complex picture of the possible combinations of identifications though; the novelty of identification with Europe plays an important part in the pattern. The first factor correspond to the process of identification with any available territorial community: respondent who have a strong tendency to identify with one of them are thus likely to identify with any other, including Europe; while those who do not tend to identify strongly with traditional levels of belonging do not display the same tendency to project themselves in newly made available level of citizenry. We confirm here that feeling "very" attached or proud correspond to a different process than less intense feeling of belonging (Duchesne & Frognier 1995) .
It is not surprising then that "very" items do not load on the second factor. The second factor accounts for the competitive process of identification with different potential sovereign territories, and more particularly for the competition between the new European polity and older national and subnational political communities. As "very" items are indicators of cumulative tendencies, they do not contribute to the second factor.
According to us, this analysis gives a clear evidence of the complex combination of territorial attachments that result from the dual process of identification with a political community, especially when a new one develops. The way people of Europe become European -in the subjective sense, that is, develop a feeling of belonging to the EU -depends on what the EU means to them. For those who have a strong disposition to "we-feeling", the European Union is likely to be considered an encompassing territory in which all other belonging are nested. For others, it is more likely to be experienced as a growing power, which competes with older sovereign political communities. In this later case, the framing of Europe, the way elites and mass media in the different European countries account for European integration, strongly influences people's disposition to develop a new allegiance and reorder their older ones.
CONCLUSION
This paper tries to make sense of the paradoxical statistical relationship between indicators of attachment to Europe and its nations. In the literature, some authors comment on a negative relationship that they consider a sign persistent nationalistic feeling; while others observe a positive relationship that they interpret as the consequence of the complex nature of identities -nested, marbled, or multidimensional.
We suggest stopping to consider European identity as a fact. Instead, we analyse attachment to Europe as a process, a process of identification with a new, growing potential political community 18 . As a consequence, we proceed to a diachronic analysis of indicators of attachment to any territorial levels, using Eurobarometer data sets. We show over time that European identification is directly related to national identifications, and that the relationship established between these two identifications is consistent, despite the fact that it changes according to the context. We interpret the changes we observe as a consequence of the duality of the process of identification with territorial political communities.
On one hand, identification is a process that results from the sociologically and politically determined individual disposition to feel a member of a community, that is, to feel subjectively involved in the community or groups to which someone objectively belongs. In this respect, nations still appear to be a powerful vehicle for the development of such a disposition of "we" feeling which, in particular, can then be extended to other nested territories such as the European Union. On the other hand, identification results from the sociological and political process of community building which is made easier by the limitation of the community, and is hence fuelled by pointing out some significant "other" such as the European Union. In the short term, the exclusive dimension is a direct consequence of the actions of national leaders, who endeavour to preserve their power and decision-making space.
These two processes of national and European identifications interact in such a way that the relationship between these two levels of identification is often difficult to spot. From 1994 to 2000, it seems possible to trace the effect of European electoral campaigns or other specific public debates about the EU. In such periods, the relationship between our indicators of European and national identification becomes significantly negative, while in the meantime, the relationship is weaker or non significant. In these periods of public debates about the EU, the arguments of national anti-European activists activate the potential antagonism between Europe and its nations. Between 1994 and 2000, the only available variable to measure European identification is a question which implies a competition between the two levels of belonging, and therefore the activation of this underlying antagonism has a strong influence on the relationship between European and national identifications. In other contexts, that is, when the public debate about European integration is less acute, we observe no statistical relationship between our indicators of national and European identifications. We interpret this as a neutralization effect of the two processes at work in territorial identification, the cumulative and the competing ones.
Since 2000, with the Euro, the enlargement and the Convention, public debate about the EU has become recurrent. Indeed, the relationship between our former indicators remains significantly negative. However the growing questions about the nature of European civic commitment have contributed to introduce new questions about European feelings of belonging in the Eurobarometer surveys. Thanks to that, we can observe at the same time, with different indicators, a reversed relationship between European and national identifications: a significantly positive one. We interpret this paradox as complementary evidence for our former interpretation of the dual process of territorial identification.
What are the consequences of these results? From a scientific point of view, it seems pointless to continue to dispute the cumulative or competing character of national and European belongings: they are both empirically confirmed. We consider more appropriate to analyse in greater depth the complex combination of identification processes. The aim would be to find ways to promote a European identification in which Europeans feel committed to the EU without being exclusively so. Fear of the xenophobic and exclusive attitudes of nationalists have lead promoters of Europe to frame the EU as a post national, universalistic forward-looking concept (Soysal 2002) . The low turn out to European elections, as well as a continuing gap between elites and working class attitudes toward the EU may be interpreted as evidence of the relative failure of this strategy. Finding a way to promote the cumulative dimension of European identification without the exclusive one would offer another way of contributing to European integration.
